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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
GREAT SALT LAKE AUTHORITY, 
Plaintiff wnd Respondent, 
-vs-
ISLAND RANCHING COMPANY, 
Defendamt and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
10395 
This case is brought before the Court on Interlocu-
tory Appeal under the provisions of Rule 72 (b), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. The nature of the action is 
one in eminent domain, commenced by the Respondent 
to acquire properties of the Appellant. Issues of law 
relating to the constitutional validity of the legislation 
establishing the Great Salt Lake Authority and the power 
of that Agency to condemn the lands of Appellant are 
raised in this Appeal. 
2 
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT 
On May 26, 1965, the trial Court entered an Order 
denying the Motion of Island Ranching Company to dis-
miss the Complaint in condemnation of the Respondent 
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted. On the same date, the lower Court also ordered 
that the time in which Island Ranching Company was 
otherwise required to respond to the Complaint, be ex-
tended so as to permit the Company to file with this 
Court a petition for interlocutory appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
It is submitted in this Appeal that the Order of 
the trial Court denying Appellant's Motion to dismiss 
should be reversed for errors of law and, that the case 
be remanded to the District Court with directions to 
dismiss the Complaint of Respondent for its failure to 
state a claim as a matter of law, upon which relief can 
be granted. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts underlying this Appeal may be readily 
capsulized. The Appellant, Island Ranching Company, 
has been for many years last past and is now the owner 
in fee simple of substantially all of that property known 
as Antelope Island in the western section of Davis 
County, Utah. In N overnber of 1964, Respondent, Great 
Salt Lake Authority (referred to in this Brief as 
"GSLA"), filed a Complaint in the District Court for 
Davis County to expropriate, by eminent domain, soroe 
8 
4,198 acres of the Island, all of which property was 
owned by the Appellant. (R. 1-3). Within the time per-
mitted by Rule 12, U.R.C.P., Appellant filed a Motion 
to dismiss (R. 4-5) the Complaint for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief could be granted. As a basis 
for the Motion, it was specifically urged that: 
1. The Enabling Act of GSLA (65-8-1 through 
8, U.C.A. 1953, as amended) is constitutionally in-
valid and unenforceable for its failure to define the 
territorial limits of the Agency's jurisdiction. 
2. The GSLA Act is constitutionally invalid for 
vagueness, lack of legslative standards and declared 
public purpose. 
3. Notwithstanding a finding of constitutional 
enforceability of the Act, the Statute did not grant 
to GSLA the power to acquire Antelope Island or 
any part thereof by eminent domain. 
4. That by reason of all or any of the fore-
going, the condemnation of the Company's property 
by GSLA would result in an unlawful expropriation 
of the sanie in violation of Appellant's right to be 
secure therefrom, and without due process of law, 
contrary to Article I, Section VII, Utah State Con-
stitution and Amendment XIV, United States Con-
stitution. 
Oral argument of counsel for the parties on these 
issues was taken by the trial Court on the 8th day of 
4 
February, 1965. Memoranda on the applicable law were 
also submitted by counsel, respectively. 
On May 25, 1965, the trial Court entered an Order 
denying the Company's Motion to dismiss on all counts. 
(R. 8-9). Appellant's Petition to this Court for inter-
locutory appeal and review of the lower Court's order 
denying the Motion to dismiss followed in June, 1965. 
(R. 15-28). This Court, under Order dated June 29, 1965, 
granted the Petition for interlocutory appeal and ac-
cepted jurisdiction to review the issues of law raised by 
Appellant's Motion and set out in said Petition. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LEGAL SUFFICIENCY OF THE COM-
PLAINT OF GSLA IS PROPERLY TESTED 
BY APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS. 
It was before the trial Court and is the position 
of Island Ranching Company herein that the Complaint 
of GSLA fails, as a matter of law, to state a claim upon 
which relief may be granted as against the Appellant. 
Such Plea in Bar is properly raised by Motion under 
Rule 12(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. That Rule, 
in part, provides : 
"The following defense may at the option of 
the pleader be made by motion : * * • ( 6) Failure 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted . . . " 
The Company, by the Motion, admits only the well-
pleaded allegations of fact in the Complaint. Clark v. 
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Nebersee Finanz Korporation, 332 U.S. 480, 68 S..Ct. 174, 
92 L.Ed. 148; Chica.go Metallic M anuf acti1,.ring Company 
v. Edward Katzi<nger Co., 123 F.2d 518 (7 Cir. 1941). 
Neither conclusions of law nor mixed statements of law 
and fact set forth in the Complaint are, by Appellant's 
Motion to dismiss, acknowledged or admitted. Newport 
News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. Schauffler, 303 
U.S. 54, 58 S.Ct. 466, 82 L.Ed. 546; Hess v. Petrifllo, 259 
F.2d 735 (7 Cir. 1958). Moore, in his work on Federal 
Practice, Vol. II, Section 12.08, page 2244, outlines the 
effect of a motion under Rule 12(b) (6): 
"A motion to dismiss is the usual and proper 
method of testing the legal sufficiency of the com-
plaint. For the purposes of the motion, the well-
pleaded material allegations of the complaint are 
taken as admitted; but conclusions of law or un-
warranted deductions of fact are not admitted." 
Accordingly, only the material assertions of fact 
under Paragraphs 2, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of GSLA's Complaint 
are admitted by the Company under the Motion to dis-
miss. Conclusions embodied in the Complaint, for the 
purposes of the Motion, are denied. 
POINT II 
THE GSLA ACT IS CONSTITUTIONALLY 
INVALID AND UNENFORCEABLE FOR ITS 
FAIL URE TO DEFINE OR DELIMIT THE 
TERRITORIAL BOUNDARIES OF THE 
AGENCY'S JURISDICTION. 
(1) Island Ranching Company has standing to 
raise the constitutional invalidity of the 
GSLA Act. 
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The rule is well settled that a private individual, 
who is injuriously affected by an enactment of the leg-
islature, may directly attack its constitutionality_ Weber 
v. Palmer Bros., 270 U.S. 402, 46 S.Ct. 320, 70 L.Ed. 654. 
That is so because a legislative act which transcends 
constitutional limitations is void ab initio. As stated 
by this Court in State ex rel Univ. of Utah v. Candland 
et al, 36 Utah 406, 104 Pac. 285 (1909): 
"A legislative act which is in conflict with 
the Constitution is stillborn and of no force or 
effect - impotent alike to confer rights or to 
afford protection. This general doctrine is adop-
ted by the courts generally and is the doctrine 
promulgated by the Supreme Court of the United 
States, as appears from the case of Norton v. 
Shelby County, 118 U.S. 442, 6 Sup. Ct. 1125 (30 
L. Ed. 178), where Mr. Justice Field, in speaking 
for the court, says: 'An unconstitutional act is 
not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no du-
ties; it affords no protection; it creates no of-
fice; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative 
as though it had never been passed.' " 
While the interest of the individual litigant must be 
directly infringed by the statute in order that a consti-
tutional attack upon it be justiciable, Jackson v. City and 
County of Denver, 109 Colo. 196, 124 P.2d 240 (1942), 
it is not open to question that the estate of a landowner 
whose property is sought to be condemned, satisfies 
that standard. Illinois Dept. of Public Works v. Butler 
Co., 13 Ill. 2d 537, 150 N.E. 2d 124 (1958). In the nature 
of things, the condemnation action results in the devesti-
ture of rights in rem held by the individual in thei land. 
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The warranties of the due process clauses require not 
!t•ss than that such devestiture occur only if the statute, 
which sanctions the expropriation, is constitutionally 
adequate. Article I, Sec. VII, Utah Constitution; Amend-
ment XIV, United States Constitution; Dartmouth Col-
lege v. Woodward, 4 Wheat (U.S.) 518, 4 L.Ed. 629 
(1819); Hayes v. Port of Seattle, 251 U.S. 233, 40 S.Ct. 
125, 64 L. Ed. 234; People of Cal. v. Skinner, 18 Cal. 2d 
349, 115 P.2d 488; Nichols on Eminent Domain, Vol. I, 
Page 442, Sec. 3.5. Accordingly, a landowner in eminent 
domain may attack the validity of the Act establishing 
the condernnor-agency. 11!-iller v. City of Tacoma., 378 
P.2d 464 (Wash. 1963). 
Since the rights of the Appellant in its property 
have been placed in jeopardy by the Complaint of GSiLA 
to condemn part of Antelope Island, the standing of 
Appellant to challenge the constitutionality of the En-
. abling Statute, 65-8-1 through 8, U.C.A. 1953, as 
amended, should be uncontested. 
(2) The Legislature did not specify the jurisdic-
tional boundaries of GSLA under the Act. 
GSLA is a creature of the Legislature. I ts power 
to act is one of delegation and limitation. Delegation in 
the sense that the responsibilities, assignments and func-
tions stern from the Legislature. Limitation to the extent 
that the power of the Agency is confined to and re-
stricted by the proscribed and enacted law. Its facili-
ties are of a strictly derivative and not inherent or self-
styled nature. Piercy v. Civil Service Comm. of Salt 
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Lake City, 116 Utah 135, 208 P.2d 1123 (1949). The prin-
ciple is recorded in Gouge v. David, 185 Or. 437, 202 P.2d 
489 (1949): 
"* * * A statute which creates an adminis-
trative agency and invests it with its pown re-
stricts it to the powers granted. The agency has 
no powers except those mentioned in the statute. 
It is the statute, not the agency, which directs 
what shall be done. That statute is not a mere 
outline of policy which the agency is at liberty to 
disregard or put into effect according to its own 
ideas of the public welfare. * * *". P. 498 of 202 
P.2d. 
Corollary to the doctrine that an administrative 
agency's power to act is measured by positive delegation 
from the legislature, is the rule that the statute under 
which the delegation is made, must particularly define 
the geographical limits of the agency's jurisdiction. 
Konold v. Rio Grande W. Ry. Co., 16 Utah 151, 51 Pac. 
256 (1897); Rowell v. State Board of Agriculture, 9S 
Utah 353, 99 P.2d 1 (1940). As an agency may not ex-
ercise substantive powers it does not possess, in parallel 
fashion it may not function extraterritorially beyond the 
reach of its land boundaries, Pennsylvania Railroad Co. 
v. Board of Pitblic Utility Conimissioners, 11 N.J. 43, 
93 A. 2d 339 (1952), K1iight v. Younkin, 61 Ida. 612, 105 
P.2d 456, and an attempt to do otherwise is void fro!ll 
the beginning. McGa,rry v. Ind-ustrial Comm. of Utah .. 
64 Utah 592, 232 Pac. 1090, 39 A.L.R. 306 (1925). 
The requirement that the territorial boundaries of 
the Agency's jurisdiction be charted, is satisfied only if 
such specification is a product of statutory definition and 
not administrative assertion by the Agency, itself. 
In De Loutch v. Scheper, 188 So. Car. 21, 198 S.E. 
±09 (1938) it was held: 
"Concededly, the Legislature cannot delegate 
to some administrative board the right to say what 
territory shall be included within a political sub-
division, for this is a duty which is devolved by 
law upon it and one which it, and it alone, must 
exercise." 
So vital to the core of the Enabling Statute is the 
requirement of territorial delimitation, that an Act which 
fails such requirement is constitutionally unenforceable. 
De Loutch v. Scheper, supra. In Revne v. Utah Trading 
Comm., 113 Utah 155, 192 P. 2d 563 (1948), this Court 
struck down the Barber Control Act as an unconstitu-
tional delegation of legislative power. One of the ob-
stacles in the Act (the la.ck of territorial boundaries) 
was pointed out by the concurring opinion: 
"Another reason affecting the validity of the 
Act is that the Legislature has also failed to 
furnish adequate territorial limits or guides. * • *" 
(P. 176 of 113 Utah.) 
An enabling statute which is not declarative of the 
agency's territorial boundaries is unconstitutional not 
only because of the uncertainty of the public body to 
act, but also because the individual is left guessing as to 
the nature of his rights under the enactment and its effect 
upon his property. Such lack of notice is violative of due 
]H'ocess of law requirements. State of Utah v. Packard, 
1~~ Utah 369, 250 P.2d 561 (1952). Thus, the Illinois 
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Supreme Court, in McDougall v. Litcdcr, 389 Ill. 141, 58 
N.E. 2d 899 (1945), said: 
"We have repeatedly held that, to be valid, 
an Act may not be vague, indefinite and uncertain, 
but must be complete when it leaves the Legi8-
lature and be sufficiently explicit to advise every-
one what his rights are under it and how he will 
be affected by its operation. * * *" (P. 906 of 58 
N. E. 2d.) 
So the question put to the Court in this Appeal is -
whether the territorial boundaries of GSLA are ade-
quately defined by the Act, 65-8-1 et seq., U.C.A. 1953, 
as amended. 
At the outset, the obvious conclusion drawn from this 
legislation is that it does not have state-wide significance. 
Throughout the 9 Sections of the Act, the focus is sonw-
where near the geographical regions of Great Salt Lake, 
far short of state boundaries. But apart from that fact, 
a reading of the Act makes it crystal clear that the 
territorial boundaries of G SLA are totally absent. There 
is no declaration by meets and bounds, no estahli:-hrd 
markers, monuments or geographical limits set out in 
any part of the Statute. rrhe singular reference to terri-
torial area in the Act is found in 65-8-1 and 6 of the Act. 
The former Section, having to do with membership of 
GSLA, provides that appointment shall be predicated 
upon "understanding of and interest in the Great Salt 
Lake and its environs." Under 65-8-6, Paragraph 8, it is 
provided that GSLA shall reserve revenues for the de-
velopment and administration of "the Great Salt Lake 
and its environs.'' Neither of the Sections is of assistancr 
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in determining the jurisdictional boundaries of GSLA. 
11he phrase, "Great Salt Lake and its environs" appears 
hnt in connection with specific subject-matter, the first 
11,ith GSLA membership and the latter with administra-
tion of revenues. The phrase is given a generic and in-
determinant usage and is not a declaration of territorial 
limits. 
"\Vhether the coined phrase "Great Salt Lake and its 
environs" includes exposed but former lake bed lands, 
islands, beaches, tourist areas, arterial highways and the 
like is uncertain. The word "environs" is no litmus since 
that word implies only a meaning of surrounding in-
fluence and conditions. U. S. v. Amadio, 215 F. 2d 605 
(7 Cir. 1954). Not once in the Statute has the Legislature 
come close to a definitive statement of the boundaries of 
GRLA. The latter is as wide or as narrow as the whims 
of the members of the Authority dictate from time to time. 
(3) The jurisdictional boundaries of GSLA can-
not, under the facts of this case, be resolved 
by reference to the title of the Act. 
It was argued by GSLA before the trial Court that 
the defect in the Statute to define the geographical 
boundaries of GSLA was really no defect at all, because 
it was said, the title to the Act clearly describes the 
territorial limits and for constitutional purposes, sup-
plies any statutory deficiency. 
That Title as found in the Laws of Utah 1963, 
' provides: 
"GREAT SALT LAKE AUTHORITY 
An Act Relating to the Development of All 
of the l\1 ainland, Islands, Minerals and vVater 
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Within the Great Salt Lake Meander Line Esta-
blished by the United States Surveyor General· 
Providing for the Creation of the Great Salt Lak~ 
Authority to Formulate and Execute a Program 
for Such Development and Appropriating $200,-
000 from the General Fund to the Great Salt 
Lake Authority." Laws of Utah 1963, Ch. 161, P. 
566. 
It was thus claimed that the territorial boundary of the 
Agency was the meander line as established by the U.S. 
Surveyor General. 
There are several reasons why the contention of 
GSLA in this regard cannot stand. Foremost, is the 
fact that the meander line is mentioned in the body of the 
Statute but once, and only then in connection with the 
division of operational revenues. 65-8-6, Paragraph 8. 
The thrust of that Paragraph relates wholly to intra-
mural activities of the Agency. Its use in the Statute 
is plainly non-jurisdictional. 
Secondly, is the fact that Section 65-8-6 of the Act 
makes it quite clear that the meander line was not in-
tended as a boundary line. Rather, as set forth in Para-
graph 8 thereof, it is merely a reference point, within or 
without which "the Great Salt Lake and its environs~' 
might fluctuate: 
"The Authority shall not receive revenues 
which accrue * * * from mineral leases * * * within 
the Great Salt Lake Meander Line established hy 
the United States Surveyor General. All other 
revenues, including such amounts as may be made 
available by the legislature shall be reserved and 
used in the development and administration of the 
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Great Salt Lake and its env~rons by the Author-
ity." 65-8-6, Para. 8. (Emphasis ours) 
The Paragraph, in its larger context, indicates that the 
meander line is but a part of the "Great Salt iLake and 
its environs." If it were the legislative intent that the 
meander line, so-called, was to be the jurisdictional 
boundary, specific reference to it in Paragraph 8 above 
was completely unnecessary. In that event, the Para-
graph, as in other segments of the Act, would have 
provided that mineral revenues, from lands within the, 
"boundaries of jurisdiction," would accrue to the State 
Land Board. 
Thirdly, is the long accepted rule that jurisdictional 
and constitutional requirements of a statute must be 
found in the substantive legislation and not in the title. 
Chabre v. Page, 298 Mich. 278, 299 N.W. 82 (1941); King 
v. King, 193 Misc. 750, 85 N.Y.S. 2d 563 (1948); Donahue 
v. Warner Bros. Picture Dist. Corp., 2 U. 2d 256, 272 P. 
2d 177 ( 1954). The latter is but a prologue, an expression 
of purpose, an accessory to the Act. As declared by the 
Arizona Court in Maricopa Co. v. La Prade, 45 Ariz. 61, 
·±o P. 2d 94 (1945): 
"* * * It is the body, and not the title, which 
determines whether the act is within the call for, 
after all, the body is the true legislation; the 
title and enacting clause being merely necessary 
accessories thereto. * * *" (P. 98 of 40 P. 2d.) 
Reference to a title may be made only to remove a latent 
ambiguity in the statute, itself. Donahue v. Warner 
Bros. Pichtre Dist. Corp., 2 U. 2d 256, 272 P. 2d 177 
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(1954); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. G. & 0. R. Co ., 
331 U. S. 519, 91 L. Ed. 1646 (1946). It cannot be used 
to supply constitutional vitality to a Statute which is 
otherwise deficient. A contrary conclusion would entail 
a finding that the title is a part of the statutory law, a 
result which is clearly not the rule of the case. 
Even were it concluded that resort may be had to 
the title of the GSLA Act to determine the territorial 
boundaries, it is patent under the facts of this suit, that 
such does not cure the constitutional inadequacy. The 
title of the GSLA Act refers to the development of prop-
erties and water "within the Great Salt Lake meander 
line established by the United States Surveyor General". 
This Court may and will take judicial notice of official 
acts of the U. S. Surveyor General in the establishment of 
a meander line on the Great Salt Lake. 75-25-1 (3), 
U.C.A. 1953. It is an established fact that the United 
States Surveyor had not, at the date of passage of the 
GSLA Act or has he s]nce, made a final or completed 
survey or meander of the Great Salt Lake. The Attorney 
General of Utah himself, has acknowledged the ac<'uracy 
of the point. Statenient of Attorney General, Hearing of 
U. S. Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 
Subcommittee on Public Lands, March 17, 1965, Page 20. 
Since the survey is not final or completed, there can be 
no final or complete territorial boundaries of GSLA 
under the Act, even with resort to the title. 
Under the limits of the Statute, the scope of activity 
of thi::; Agency could run to Cache County on the north, 
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Uintah Basin on the east, and St. George City on the 
south, just as well as to Antelope Island, all dependent 
upon how large a circle was selected by the Authority 
as its measuring stick. Because of that fact and the ina-
bility of Appellant to determine the nature of its rights 
under the Statute, 65-8-1 et seq. is constitutionally un-
enforceable. 
POINT III 
THE GSLA ACT IS CONSTITUTIONALLY 
INVALID BECAUSE OF UNLAWFUL 
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATTVE AUTHOR-
ITY AND STANDARDS. 
The decisional law of this Court is firm that an 
administrative statute, to be constitutionally sustained, 
must reasonably identify and circumscribe the powers, 
duties, and responsibilities of the government agency, 
as well as the regulatory standards under which it is 
to operate. N owers v. Oakden, 110 Utah 25, 169 P. 2d 
108 (1946); McGrew v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 
96 Utah 203, 85 P. 2d 608 (1938). In State of Utah v. 
Packard, 122 Utah 369, 250 P. 2d 561 (1952), this court 
quoted with approval Connally v. General Construction 
Co., 269 U. S. 385, 46 S. Ct. 126, '70 L. Ed. 322, wherein it 
was said: 
"A statute which either forbids or requires 
the doing of an act in terms so vague that men 
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at 
its meaning and differ as to its application vio-
lates the first essential of due process of law." 
(P. 374 of 122 Utah.) 
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The determined powers, functions and standards 
must be those of the legislature and not the administra-
tive body. The latter may do only what the statute 
authorizes be done. Piercey v. Civil Service Comm. of 
Salt Lake City, 116 Utah 135, 208 P. 2d 1123 (1949). If 
the statute is uncertain in the regulatory standards to be 
employed or in the powers granted and leaves to the 
Agency the determination of the same, the statute must 
fall, for it is settled beyond argument that the legislature 
may not delegate to an administrative body authority 
to determine either the powers to be exercised or the 
standard of operation. As stated by this Court in Rowell 
v. State Boa.rd of Agriculture, 98 Utah 353, 99 P. 2d 1 
(1940): 
"That the legislature may not surrender or 
delegate its legislative power is elemental. * * • 
But in the delegation of such authority, the legis-
lature must clearly mark the course to be pursued, 
and the principles, facts, and purposes to serve 
as guide posts to enable the officer to carry out, 
not his own will or judgment bitt that of the legis-
fature." (P. 358 of 98 Utah.) 
The law does not require that the legislative act 
define in infinite detail the agency's power and regulatory 
criteria. McGrew v. Indu.strial Comm. of Utah, supra. 
What is necessary is that there be in the enactment a 
statement of functions having ascertainable limitations 
and bounds, so that the statute does not become a mere 
expression of desirable legislative policy. As set forth in 
State of Kansas v. Hines, 163 Kan. 300, 182 P. 2d 865 
(1947) : 
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"Mr. Chief Justice Hughes has stated that the 
power must be limited by boundaries, circum-
scribing the limitation upon that power. Stand-
ards are difficult to define because of the variable 
nature thereof. They have been referred to as 
conditions, restrictions, limitations, yardsticks, 
guides, rules, broad outlines and similar synony-
mous expressions hereinafter set forth. It has 
been held that in the creation of administrative 
tribunals the power given them must be "canal-
ized" so that the exercise of the delegated power 
must be restrained by banks in a definitely defined 
channel. Ordinarily the standards must be suffi-
ciently fixed and determined so that in considering 
whether a section of a statute is complete or in-
complete the test is whether the provision is suf-
ficiently definite and certain to enable one reading 
it to know his rights, obligations and limitations 
thereunder. For present purposes it may be said 
that a standard is a definite plan or pattern into 
which the essential facts must be found to fit 
before specified section is authorized." (P. 872 of 
182 P. 2d.) 
The GSLA Act is a legislative hodge-podge, a Statute 
whose disciplines are dependent largely upon the 
Agency's own notions of the public welfare and of its 
periphery of operation. As already noted in Point II of 
this Brief (Pages 5-15), the Act is deficient in a pri-
mary requirement, the declaration of territorial bound-
arjes of GSLA. 
There is more to the argument of unconstitutional 
delegation. Under Paragraph 3 of 65-8-6, GSLA is given 
authority to define, by regulation, its power and juris-
diction over fish and game as between it and the State 
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Department of Fish and Game. In part, Paragraph 3 
provides: 
"The state department of fish and game shall 
retain the power and jurisdiction conferred upon 
it within the boundaries of jurisdiction of the 
Authority with reference to fish and game, subject 
to such reasonable rules and regulations as the 
Authority may make to insure the accomplishment 
of the objectives and purposes of this act." ( 65-
8-6, Para. 3). (Emphasis added.) 
Under this Section, GSLA may, by unilateral action, fi.'\, 
prescribe or change its powers and responsibilities (and 
parenthetically, the powers of the Department of Fish 
and Game) on fish and game matters, to the detriment 
and uncertainty of Appellant in its property and sur-
rounding waters. 
Paragraph 4 of 65-8-6 presents a pitfall of the same 
nature. Therein, the State Land Board retains "authority 
to manage state lands subject to reasonable riiles and 
regulations as the Authority may make to insure the 
objectives and purposes" of the Act. Under this Para-
graph, GSLA may, at its pleasure, administratively ex-
tend or contract its jurisdiction over the management of 
state lands, vis-a-vis the functions of the State Land 
Board and private parties under license, lease or contract 
with the Land Board. The Appellant is never safe in its 
dealings with the Land Board for the lease, occupancy 
or use of state land, because under Paragraph 4 of 65-8-6, 
it is eternally subject to a shifting set of rules and regula-
tions issued by an independent agency, GSLA. 
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The delegations of authority conferred under both 
Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Section are void, for they leave 
to the Agency the definition of its jurisdiction as to which 
a particular set of facts may fit. Krebs v. Thompson, Di-
rector, 387 Ill. 471, 56 N. E. 2d 761 (1944). 
The Act delegates to GSLA power to "determine 
the policies and develop the program * * * to accomplish 
the objective and purposes" of the Law. 65-8-4 & 5, U.C.A. 
1953, as amended. The latitude of operation permitted 
under this statement is carte blanche. Such delegation 
is invalid, for although the Agency is to have some discre-
tion in the execution of statutory standards, those stand-
ards are of a legislative and not an administrative char-
acter. County of Alpine v. County of Tuolumne, 49 C. 2d 
787, 322 P. 2d 449 (1958). 
Furthermore, while the Act, in several parts, makes 
reference to its "objectives and purposes," it is, in fact, 
silent as to what those objectives and purposes are. 
Viewed in its best light, the Act is merely suggestive of 
the objectives which might be obtained. Under 65-8-6, 
Paragraph 5, the Agency is to coordinate multiple, use 
of property "for such purposes" as grazing, fish and 
game, mineral removal, development of water, industrial 
resources and "other uses". In no sense is the Statute 
directive. It provides only a cue as to several of many 
courses of action which the Agency may or may not 
pursue. Under the Rule in State v. Hines, 163 Kan. 300, 
182 P. 2d 865 (1947), such uncontrolled power cannot be 
constitutionally vested in an administrative board: 
20 
"We can be certain of one test - a legislative 
fiat which provides that an administrative agency 
shall consider the elements which might affect 
legislation and then act as it sees fit - does not 
fix a standard." ( P. 872 of 182 P. 2d.) 
In contrast, a review of the enabling statutes of 
other administrative agencies of Utah pointedly illus-
trates the delegation problem inherent in the GSLA Act. 
See duties and powers of Utah State Road Commission, 
27-12-8, U.C.A. 1953, as amended; Utah Fish and Game 
Department, 23-1-1- and 14, U.C.A., 1953; and State Land 
Board, 65-1-14, U.C.A. 1953. The powers and responsi-
bilities of those agencies are precisely defined. 
Island Ranching Company is unable to ascer-
tain its rights and those of GSLA under the 
Act. 
The nature of Appellant's objection to the GSLA 
Act is not academic. It rests, as in Point II herein, on 
the ground that the lack of standards (jurisdictional, 
territorial, and regulatory) in the Law affords no notice 
and renders ISLAND RANCHING COMP ANY incap-
able of determining its rights as a property owner there-
under or the power of GSLA to affect those rights. Does 
Antelope Island lie within the territorial boundaries of 
GSLA? Is GSLA lawfully empowered to condemn the 
Island, or parts of it? Does GSLA or the State Land 
Board have the power to control state lands adjunct to 
Antelope Island, and the lease, use and development there-
of by Appellant? The answers to these questions are open 
game under the Statute. They are not in the GSLA Law 
as they necessarily must be. The Act should accordingly 
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be declared unconstitutional as in violation of Appellant's 
right to due process of law as guaranteed by Article I, 
Section VII, Utah Constitution and Amendments XIV, 
United States Constitution. 
POINT IV 
THE ENABLING ACT DOES NOT GRANT 
TO GSLA POWER TO ACQUIRE ANTE-
LOPE ISLAND (or any part thereof) BY 
EMINENT DOMAIN. 
(1) The Statute empowers GSLA to acquire the 
Island by voluntaJry and consensual means only. 
If this Court upholds the GSLA Act as constitution-
ally enforceable, against the arguments advanced by 
Appellant in Points II and III herein, the issue whether 
the Agency has been granted the power to condemn the 
Company's property, Antelope Island, must yet be re-
solved. The key to that question lies in the Act, itself. 
65-8-6, Paragraph 10, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, is specific 
as to the manner in which GSLA may acquire or obtain 
Antelope Island: 
"The Authority is authorized to take any 
steps that are necessary to secure such part of 
Antelope Island by donation, purchase agreement, 
lease, or other lawful means * * *." (Paragraph 10 
of 65-8-6.) 
The phrase "donation, purchase agreement, lease or 
other lawful means" is decisive for it sets the sole 
standard by which GSLA's power to acquire Antelope 
Island is measured. Several methods are prescribed to 
obtain the land. The Agency may accept a donation, 
either inter vivos or testamentary. The Island, or parts, 
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may be obtained through purchase agreement which con-
ceivably would encompass a contract sale, a land ex-
change or a combination thereof. A possessory estate 
may be acquired by lease, inferentially, under mutually 
acceptable terms and conditions.* 
The means of acquisition are common in one regard. 
Each and all require a voluntary transfer from the prop-
erty owner to GSLA, a transfer which is based upon an 
agreement of the parties and in all respects demands 
acquiescence and consent of Island Ranching Company. 
By definition, the power to condemn Antelope Island has 
not been granted, for a taking through involuntary means 
is excluded. Paragraph 10 of 65-8-6 is the only segment 
of the law specifically concerned with the acquisition of 
Antelope Island. 
Nor does GSLA have a natural right or power to 
condemn the Island. As to the State of Utah, eminent 
domain is a right inherent in sovereignty, the exercise of 
which is not dependent upon constitutional grace. BmJer 
v. County of Ventura, 45 C. 2d 276, 289 P. 2d 1 (1955); 
Liddick v. City of Council Bluffs, 232 Iowa 197, 5 N. W. 
2d 361 ( 1942). The capacity of GSLA, as an administra-
tive arm of the State to condemn private property rests, 
however, on far different grounds. Its authority to con-
demn is not a matter of right, but a power which is 
operative only through a specific delegation and grant 
from the legislature. Nichols on Eminent Domain, Vol. 1, 
Page 314, Section 3.2 states the rule : 
*The words "or other lawful means" in Paragraph 10 will be treated 
in Sub-paragraph 2 of this Point. 
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"The right to authorize the exercise of emi-
nent domain is legislative, and there can be no 
taking of private property for public use without 
the consent of the owner and in the absence of 
direct authority from the Legislature. The power 
of eminent domain lies dormant until legislative 
action is had, pointing out the occasions, modes, 
agencies, and conditions for its exercise." (P. 314 
of 1 Nichols on Eminent Domain.) 
~L1he rule that the powers, functions, and jurisdiction 
of an administrative agency are confined to and limited 
by statutory grant, Piercey v. Civil Service Comm. of 
Salt Lake City, 116 Utah 135, 208 P. 2d 1123 (19·49), is of 
particular significance in the delegation of eminent do-
main power. That is so because the power requires an 
E>xpress grant of the legislature, is never implied, and 
is strictly construed against the agency seeking to exer-
cise the same. Bertagnoli v. Baker, et al., 117 Utah 348, 
~15 P. 2d 626 (1950); Moyle et al v. Salt Lake City, 111 
Utah 201, 176 P. 2d 882 (1947). In Bertagnoli, the Salt 
Lake City Board of Education sought to condemn prop-
erty, a part of which was contiguous to but without 
the Board's territorial limits. The Board had been grant-
ed, by statute, power to condemn for school building 
sites, but the law was silent on the matter of extra-
territorial condenmation. The Board argued that the 
power of eminent domain had been granted expressly, 
and that together ''rith its implied powers, gave to it a 
constructive right to condemn extraterritorially. In re-
jecting the claim of the Board to condemn, this Court 
l'Pcognized the Board was of limited authority: 
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"In previous decisions of this court we have 
recognized that boards of education are public 
municipal corporations; that their powers are 
purely statutory; * * * Also, that the boards of 
education have only such powers as are expressly 
conferred upon them and such implied powers 
as are necessary to execute and carry into effect 
their express powers. Chamberlain v. Watters, 
10 Utah 298, 37 P. 566; Beard v. Board of Educa-
tion, 81 Ut1ah 51, 16 P. 2d 900. Thus we must 
examine the statutes of this state to determine the 
extent of the authority given to boards of educa-
tion to condemn land for proper purposes." (P. 
627 of 215 P. 2d.) 
This Court went on to say that the power of eminent 
domain is antithetic to private ownership of property 
and consequently, is exercisable only when expressly 
authorized by Statute: 
"When the power of eminent domain is given 
by statute, it is a well settled principle of law 
amply supported by cases from many jurisdic-
tions in this country, that the extent to which 
the power may be exercised is limited to the ex-
press terms and clear implication of the statute. 
(Citing authorities) * * * The right of eminent 
domain, being in derogation of the rights of in-
dividual ownership in property, has been strictly 
construed by the courts so that no person will be 
wrongfully deprived of the use and enjoyment of 
his property. (Citing authorities) * * * " (P. 628 
of 215 P. 2d.) 
The decision of the Court dismissed the suggestion that 
eminent domain could be constructively implied from 
general legislation: 
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"Thus it follows that the authority contended 
for by the School Board not having been expressly 
given and not being clearly inferable from our 
statutes, must be denied it. Under the authorities 
on this subject, power cannot be derived from the 
doubtful inferences which support the School 
Board's claim of authority." (P. 630 of 215 P. 2d.) 
The concurring opinion in Bertagnoli emphasizes the 
harshness of eminent domain and that its employment is 
to be narrowly limited: 
"I believe it well to emphasize the concept 
that the right to condemn property is in deroga-
tion of common rights and permits the taking 
away from a land-owner the property he desires to 
retain. A man's home may be taken by the state 
or one of its political subdivisions if the governing 
body believes it necessary for a public purpose. 
This is a drastic method of taking when consider-
ed from the viewpoint of the person whose prop-
erty is condemned. Accordingly, we must jealously 
guard the individual's rights and not infer the 
authority unless the express purpose of the legis-
lation demands that the power be vested in the 
school board." (P. 630 of 215 P. 2d.) 
In Moyle et al v. Salt Lake City, 111Utah201, 176 P. 
2d 882 (1947), the eminent domain power was described 
as arbitrary, the application of which should be guarded. 
This Court remarked: 
"The right of eminent domain is an arbitrary 
power and so the construction has limited, con-
fined and guarded the exercise of the right. * * *" 
(P. 206 of 11 Utah.) 
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The doctrine of strict construction is established as 
the rule of law throughout the several states. In Beth 
Medrosh Hagodol v. City of Aurora, 126 Colo. 267, 248 
P. 2d 732 (1952), it was held that the power to expropri-
ate private property must clearly appear by legislative 
grant: 
"By necessary implication, above mentioned, 
vague or doubtful language must be excluded. It 
follows that if there is doubt, then there has been 
no grant of such power by the State. . . . The 
power is specifically and unequivocally granted, 
or it is withheld." (P. 735 of 248 P. 2d.) 
The Washington Supreme Court in State of Wash-
ing ton v. Superior Cou.1.rt, et al., 19 Wash. 2d 791, 144 P. 
2d 916 ( 1944), was of the same judgment: 
"The right to exercise the power of eminent 
domain is one of the highest powers exercised by 
the sovereign. This right will not be implied, nor 
will it be extended beyond express statutory au-
thority. The law is clearly stated in 1 Lewis on 
Eminent Domain, 3d Ed., p. 679, ~371, as follows: 
'The exercise of the power being against common 
right, it cannot be implied or inferred from vague 
or doubtful language, but must be given in express 
terms or by necessary implication. When the 
right to exercise the power can only be niade out 
by argument and inference, it does not exist: 
"There mitst be no effort to prove the existence of 
sitch high corporate right, else it is in d01tbt, an:Z, 
if so, the state has not granted it." If the act ~s 
silent on the subject, and the powers given by it 
can be exercised without resort to condemnation, 
it is presumed that the legislature intended that 
the necessary property should be acquired by eon-
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tract.' And p. 708, ~388: 'All grants of power by 
the government are to be strictly construed and 
this is especially true with respect to the ;ower 
of eminent domain, which is more harsh and per-
emptory in its exercise and operation than any 
other.'" (P. 920 of 144 P. 2d.) (Emphasis ours.) 
If, under the statute, doubt exists as to the power 
to condemn, the finding must be against the agency seek-
ing its use. As applied in the immediate case, the fore-
going authorities hold that since Paragraph 10 of 65-8-6 
fails to specifically grant to GSLA the power to condemn 
Antelope Island, the acquisition of Appellant's property 
is limited to donation, purchase agreement and lease, 
modes all requiring the acquiescence of the property 
owner. This is the net result unless the Court determines 
that the phrase "or other lawful means," as used in 
Paragraph 10 constitutes an adequate grant of eminent 
domain power. 
(2) The words "or other lawful means" following 
the phrase "by donation, purchase agreement, 
lease" in Paragraph 10 of 65-8-6 do not con-
stitute a grant of eminent domain power to 
GSLA. 
The modifying clause "or other lawful means" in 
Paragraph 10 cannot bestow upon GSLA the power to 
condemn Antelope Island. Since eminent domain requires 
a specific commission from the legislature, and since that 
has not been granted GSLA herein, the phrase contains 
no formula for an exercise of the power. To hold other-
wise is to advocate a rule of "condemnation by statutory 
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implication," an argument thoroughly repudiated in Ber-
tagnoli v. Baker, (Utah) supra. 
The true meaning of the phrase "or other lawful 
means" in Paragraph 10, is not clear. Whether standing 
alone or as a part of the larger paragraph, its use is both 
ambiguous and indeterminate. Under such conditions, it 
is necessary as well as appropriate that resort be had 
to accepted canons of statutory construction to remove 
the ambiguity and uncertainty. In Re Stevens' Estate, 
102 Utah 255, 130 P. 2d 85 (1942); Salt Lake Union Stock-
yards v. State Tax C01nm. et al., 93 Utah 166, 71 P. 2d 
538 (1937). 
Ejusdum Generis - Thing of Same Kind or Class. 
This Court has employed ejusdum generis in a host 
of cases to resolve legislative uncertainty. Memorial 
Gardens of the Valley v. Love, 5 U. 2d 270, 300 P. 2d 628 
(1956) ; Donahiie v. Warner Bros. Picture Distributing 
Co., 2 U. 2d 256, 272 P. 2d 177 (1954); Hansen v. Boaird 
of Editcaifion of Emery County School District, 100 Utah 
15, 116 P. 2d 936 (1941). Typical is the statement in 
Stone v. Salt Lake City, 11 U. 2d 196, 356 P. 2d 631 (1960) 
wherein this Court said: 
"The familiar and universally recognized rule 
is that general terms following specific terms are 
interpreted to mean things of like character.'' 
(P. 204 of 11 U. 2d.) 
As applied herein, the phrase "or other lawful 
means" refers to methods of acquiring Antelope Island 
of like stature and rank as those set out immediatrly 
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preceding in Paragraph 10 of 65-8-6, i.e., donation, pur-
chase agreeme1lt, and lease. It complements the existent 
means of voluntary acquisition but does not add a new 
class permitting an involuntary appropriation. 
The use of this constructive aid is sound. If the 
Legislature had intended that the words "or other lawful 
means" should be interpreted in an unlimited sense (to 
include eminent domain), it would have provided that: 
[* * * The Authority is authorized to secure such part 
of Antelope Island by all lawful means.] As it stands, 
no function is served by the words "donation, purchase 
agreement, and lease" in Paragraph 10, unless by such, 
the legislative intent was to establish a particular type or 
class of acquisition procedures. Thus, in the case of 
In Re Bush Terminal Co., 93 F. 2d 659 (2 C. A. 1938), 
wherein the clause "oil, gas, gasoline and other combusti-
bles" was under examination, it was determined that the 
phrase did not include coal because: 
"* * * if the Legislature had intended the 
general words to be used in their unrestricted 
sense, it would have made no mention of the 
particular classes." (P. 606 of 93 F. 2d.) 
See also Southern Ry. Co. v. Columbia Congress 
Co., 280 Fed. 344 ( 4 C.A. 1922) where it was said: 
"The words 'other or any other,' following an 
enumeration of particular classes, are therefore 
to be read as 'other such like,' and to include only 
others of like kind of character." (P. 3'48 of 280. 
Fed.) 
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A case, whose facts are closely allied to those before 
this Court is Lorenz, et al., v. Campbell, et ai., 110 Vt. 
________ , 3 A. 2d 548 ( 1939). There, the Vermont Court had 
before it for interpretation a statute authorizing plaintiff 
to condemn property for the "erection of a soldier'8 
monument or for other public purpose." The Town 
Authority, under such enactment, attempted to condemn 
land for a public park. Applying ejusdum generis, it was 
held that the phrase "other public purpose" was re-
stricted to the acquisition of property approximating the 
same size as that to be used for a soldier's monument. 
"In P. L. Section 3562, the statute which we 
are considering, the words 'for the erection of a 
soldier's monument' are followed by words of a 
more general meaning, namely, 'or for other pub-
lic purpose.' 
"It is a rule of construction that when words 
of a particular description are followed by words 
of general import the latter can be held to include 
only things similar in character to those specially 
named." 
Exprcssio itnius est exclusio alteriits - to cnimierate is 
to exclude. 
Equally approved in this jurisdiction is the construc-
tion maxim that a specification of things or powers in 
a statute eliminates all other things or powers not so 
specified. This Court relied on the canon in Rapi.d 
Transit Co. v. Ogden City, ct al., 89 Utah 54G, 58 P. 2d. 1 
( 1936). The question before the Court was whrthcr 
Ogden City had been granted, by statute, power to op-
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erate a bus system. The statute under reading gave the 
City authority to maintain a street railway. Noting that 
both street railways and motor buses were in common 
usage at the time the law was enacted, this Court found 
the power to be lacking and in so doing stated: 
"Many reasons might be suggested why the 
Legislature confined the grant of power to the 
use and operation of street railways, but to do so 
would be mere speculation. Whatever reasons the 
lawmaking power my have had in mind is no con-
cern to the courts whose duty it is to give effect to 
the language used according to its fair import. It 
is one of the well recognized canons of statutory 
construction that when a statute directs a thing 
may be done by a specified means or in a particu-
lar manner it may not be done by other means or 
in a different manner. The familiar maxim ex-
pressio imius est exclusio alterius is especially 
applicable in the construction of a statute." (P. 
551 of 89 Utah.) 
The case of Village of Walthill v. Iowa Electric Light 
and Power Co., 125 F. Supp. 859 (D. Neb.195-1) is of value 
because of its likeness of facts and rationale. Therein, 
the Village attempted to condemn defendant's gas distri-
bution system for municipal use. The law of Nebraska 
empowered the Village to condemn for a gas plant and 
also provided that the Village should have power to take 
private property "for any other public purpose." It was 
rlecisioned that eminent domain is strictly construed 
against the condemnor, that a gas plant was not within 
the fran1ework of a gas distribution system, that the 
statute by enumerating a gas plant, excluded therefrom 
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the power to condemn for other gas facilities and lastly, 
that the phrase, "any other public purpose" was limited 
to the class particularly set out. It was said: 
"The power of eminent domain is conferred 
by statute in derogation of the common law, and 
the statutes conferring the povver should be con-
strued strictly in favor of the landowner. (P. 863 
of 125 F. Supp.) 
* * * * 
"It is true that the words 'for any other public 
purpose' appearing in the above statute are broad 
enough to encompass the purpose of distributing 
gas. However, these general terms are preceded 
by a specific enumeration of public purpose prop-
erty, namely, market houses, market places and 
parks. Under the doctrine of ejusdum generiB, 
the general term 'any other public purpose' must 
be limited to those purposes of the same general 
nature or class as the ones enumerated, to wit, 
market houses, market places and parks. * * * A 
gas distribution system would not seem to be the 
same general nature as a market place or park. 
"It is interesting to note that the legislature, 
by the same statute quoted above, vested the 
villages with power to condemn for the purpose 
of 'establishing or operating power plants' to 
supply the villages with public utility service. 
However, no express aitthority is given to con-
,demn for the purpose of operating a distribittin_g 
system only; and under the doctrine of expres~io 
unius est exclusio alterius, no su.ch authority 
should be implied." 
The particular methods of acquisition having been 
enumerated in Paragraph 10 of 65-8-6, the rule of con-
struction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, excludes 
other methods (eminent domain). 
Admittedly, the canons of construction discussed in 
this Point are not indelible. They are, rather, tools of 
construction to aid in the interpretation of ambiguo$ 
legislation. Mr. Justice Holmes referred to them as "ax-
ioms of experience." Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United 
States, 278 U. S. 41, 49 S. Ct. 52, 73 L. Ed. 170 (1928). 
However, both axioms are logical and conventional, are 
accepted at the common law, 68-3-1, U.C.A. 19'53, and by 
this Court, and both have application to the Statute 
under consideration. Simply put, they warrant a finding 
that the Statute empowers GSLA to acquire Antelope 
Island by donation, purchase agreement, lease or by any 
other means of like class and nature, none of which en-
compasses eminent domain. 
(3) The "special" paragraph (10) in 65-8-6, U.C.A. 
pertaining to Antelope Island, takes prece-
dence over and controls the "general" para-
graph (1) of that Section respecting the power 
of eminent domain. 
There is no contest that under Paragraph 1 of 65-
8-6, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, GS.LA is accorded the 
power to condemn property, in general. That Paragraph 
provides in part: 
"The Authority shall have power • • • to 
acquire real and personal property • • • by all 
legal and proper means, including purchases, 
gifts, devise, eminent domain, lease, exchange . . . " 
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It is the contention of GSLA that such grant is ade-
quate for the condemnation of Ante:lope Island - the 
argument being that since all parts of a statute should be 
read in pari materia, the delegation of eminent domain 
power in the general paragraph (1) has application to 
and invades the language of the special paragraph (10), 
the latter particularly touching upon the means of acquir-
ing Appellant's land, Antelope Island. The issue thus 
drawn is whether a general grant of eminent domain 
power in a statute is controlled and limited by a sub-
sequent or later reference in the same act to special 
powers and means of acquiring particular property. The 
question is to be answered in the affirmative. 
That a general power in an act is controlled and 
limited by a subsequent reference to special powers 
affecting particular subject matter is supported by the 
great weight of authority. In State ex rel. Public Service 
Comm. v. Southern Pacific R. R. Co., 95 Utah 84, 79 P. 
2d 25 (19,38), this Court, mindful that all parts of a 
statute are to be interpreted in relation to each other, 
determined that a special provision in an enactment was 
restrictive of a general power otherwise given therein. 
This Court, through Folland C. J., said: 
"Counsel for the State Tax Commission 
argues that we should read together and harn~on­
ize Section 3 and 11 of article 13 of the Constitu-
tion, amended in 1930, and that by so doing we 
can sustain the constitutionality of chapters 87 
and 100, Laws of Utah 1937, on the theory that 
the State Tax Commission may exercise the power 
to assess until the Legislature prescribes regula-
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tions which shall control the commision's discre-
tion in the matter. Of course the two sections 
must be read together and a definite meaning 
attached to each. The rule, however, is that, where 
there is a general provision and a specific one, the 
specific must be given full effect. 11 Am. Jur. 663. 
This rule of statutory construction was upheld 
in Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake County, 60 Utah 
423, 209 P. 207, wherein it was said (page 208): 
'Further, it is an elementary doctrine 
that, where two statutes treat of the same 
subject-matter, the one general and the other 
special in its provisions, the special provir 
sions control the general. State ex rel. Morck 
v. White, 41 Utah 480, 126 P. 330; N elden v. 
Clark, 20 Utah 382, 59 P. 524, 77 Am. St. Rep. 
917; University of Utah v. Richards, 20 Utah 
457, 59 P. 96, 77 Am. St. Rep. 928; Crane vs. 
Reeder, 22 Mich. 322.'" (P. 111 of 95 Utah.) 
In Rolls v. State of California, 19 C. 2d 713, 123 P. 
2d 505, ( 1942), the California Supreme Court stated the 
doctrine well : 
"It is well settled, also, that a general pro-
vision is controlled by one that is special, the latter 
being treated as an execption to the former. A 
specific provision relating to a particular subject 
will govern in respect to that subject, as against 
the general provision, although the latter, stand-
ing alone, would be broad enough to include the 
subject to which the more particular provision 
relates." (P. 512 of 123 P. 2d.) 
To the same effect, see also Bilyeu v. State Em-
ployees Retirement System, 58 C. 2d 618, 25 Cal. Rptr. 
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562 (1962); Sakrison v. Pierce, 66 Ariz. 162, 185 P. 2d 
528 (1947); Woods v. Spoturno, 183 Atl. 319 (Del. 1936). 
While GSLA has, therefore, the power to condemn 
under the general Paragraph 65-8-6 (1), it does not have 
the power with respect to Antelope Island, because the 
special Paragraph, 65-8-6 (10) excludes eminent domain 
as a means of acquisition. The two Paragraphs, when 
read together, are productive of no other construction. 
Both are saved and neither is rendered meaningless. 
If the Legislature had intended that GSLA was to 
have the power to condemn Antelope Island, it would 
have provided so in one of two ways: 
1. Paragraph 10 of 65-8-6 would have stated 
that [The Authority is authorized * * * to secure 
* * *Antelope Island by donation, purchase agree-
ment, lease, eminent domain, etc.]; or 
2. Paragraph 10 would have omitted all ref-
erence to means of acquiring Antelope Island. In 
such event, the manner of acquisition would have 
been determined by the general clause in Para-
graph 1 of 65-8-6. 
The fact is that the Legislature failed to adopt either 
alternative although both were obvious. What was pro-
vided is that GSLA may acquire Antelope Island by 
donation, purchase agreement, lease and other lawful 
means requiring a voluntary and consensual transaction. 
To read the general language in Paragraph 1 of 65-8-6 
into the specific clause in Paragraph 10 dealing with 
Antelope Island is to emasculate the latter along with 
most canons of statutory construction. 
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POINT V 
THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION lS TO INTER-
PRET THE STATUTE, AS IS, AND NOT 
TO ENLARGE UPON IT. 
The difficulties with the GSLA Act are neither fanci-
ful nor illusory. They are inherent in the very essence of 
the Statute. The Act is without a pronouncement of terri-
torial boundaries. There is a substantial dearth of legi-
slative standards, of proscribed responsibilities and reg-
ulatory guides. GSLA may pretty well do as it desires, 
for its authority is undefined. The trouble with that 
is that under such an Act, Appellant is denied notice as to 
its rights and liabilities and in that regard, whether at-
tempted conduct of GSLA is statutorily licensed. While 
the powers and standards of the Agency under the 
Statute must necessarily allow for discretionary and ad-
ministrative action, they must have their limits or the 
due process clause is gone. Those limits have been far 
exceeded in this Act. 
The constituitional rights of Appellant to be secure 
in its property against unlawful expropriation is on the 
line in Paragraph 10 of 65-8-6. The import of that Sec-
tion is plain - the means of acquiring Antelope Island 
are voluntary and consensual and are exclusive of the 
power of eminent domain. 
In determining the questions thus posed, the pro-
cesses of this Court are interpretative, not legislative. 
The constitutionality of the Act and the power of GSLA 
to condemn Antelope Island are judged not by those 
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policies which now seem wise, not by the factors which 
should have been but were not placed in the Law, and 
not by what the Legislature could have done but did not 
do; but upon, what, in fact, the Statute says. To explore 
the latter is the task of this Court. On the subject of 
judicial restraint, the late Mr. Justice Frankfurter had 
a few words of caution for the bench and bar: 
"Even within their area of choice, the courts 
are not at large. They are confined by the nature 
and scope of the judicial function in its particular 
exercise in the field of interpretation. * * * As a 
matter of verbal recognition certainly, no one will 
gainsay that the function in construing a statute 
is to ascertain the meaning of words used by the 
legislature. To go beyond it is to usurp a power 
which our democracy has lodged in its elected 
legislature. The great judges have constantly 
admonished their brethern of the need for disci-
pline in observing the limitations. A judge must 
not rewrite a statute, neither to enlarge nor to 
contract it. Whatever temptations the statesman-
ship of policy-making might wisely suggest, con-
struction must eschew interpolation and eviscera-
tion. He must not read in by way of creation. 
* * * * 
"This duty of restraint, this humility of func-
tion as merely the translator of another's com-
mand, is a constant theme of our Justices. It is 
on the lips of all judges, but seldom, I venture to 
believe, has the restraint which it expresses, or the 
duty which it enjoins, been observed with so con-
sistent a realization that its observance depends 
on self-conscious discipline. Cardozo put it this 
way: '1N e do not pause to consider whether a 
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statute differently conceived and framed would 
yield results more consonant with fairness and 
reason. vV e take this statute as we find it.' It was 
expressed more fully by Mr. Justice Brandeis 
when the temptation to give what might be called 
a more liberal interpretation could not have been 
wanting. 'The particularization and detail with 
which the scope of each provision, the amount of 
the tax thereby imposed, and the incidence of the 
tax, were specified, preclude an extension of any 
provision by implication to any other subject .... 
What the Government asks is not a construction of 
a statute, but, in effect, an enlargement of it by the 
court, so that what was omitted, presumably by in-
advertance, may be included within its scope.' 
An omission at the time of enactment, whether 
careless or calculated, cannot be judicially sup-
plied however much later wisdom may recommend 
the inclusion. 
"The difficulty in many instances where a 
problem of meaning arises is that the enactment 
was not directed towards the troubling question. 
The problem might then be stated, as once it was 
by Mr. Justice Cardozo, 'which choice is it the 
more likely that Congress would have made?' 
While in its context the significance and limita-
tions of this question are clear, thus to frame the 
question too often tempts inquiry into the sub-
jective and might seem to warrant the court in 
giving answers based on an unmanifested legis-
lative state of mind. But the purpose which a 
court must effectuate is not that which Congress 
should have enacted, or would have. It is that 
which it did enact, however inaptly, because it may 
fairly be said to be imbedded in the statute, even 
if a specific manifestation was not thought of, as 
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is often the very reason for casting a statute in 
very general terms." Frankfurter, Some Reflec-
tions on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. Law 
Rev. 527 (1947). 
The jurist finished by saying : 
"But there are more fundamental objections 
to loose judicial reading. In a democracy the legis-
lative impulse and its expression should come 
from those popularly chosen to legislate, and 
equipped to devise policy, as courts are not. The 
pressure on legislatures is to discharge their re-
sponsibility with care, understanding and imag-
ination should be stiffened, not relaxed. A.hove 
all, they must not be encouraged in irresponsible 
or undisciplined use of language. * * * Their re-
sponsibility is discharged ultimately by words. 
They are under a special duty therefore to observe 
that 'Exactness in the use of words is the basis 
of all serious thinking. You will get nowhere 
without it. • • • You must master the use of them, 
or you will wander forever guessing at the mercy 
of mere impulse and unrecognized assumptions 
and arbitrary associations, carried away with 
every wind of doctrine.'" Frankfurter, Some Re-
flections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. 
Law Rev. 527 (1947); Allen, Essay on Jeremy 
Bentham, The Social and Political Ideas of the 
Revolutionary Era, 181, 199 (Hearnshaw Ed. 
1931). 
Frankfurter's reflections are m point in the con-
sideration of the Act herein. 
CONCLUSION 
The GSLA Act is constitutionally unenforceable for 
its failure to define the jurisdictional boundaries. It 
denies to Appellant due process of law as secured by 
State and Federal Constitution. In all events, the Act 
does not grant to GSLA the power to condemn Antelope 
Island or its parts. 
The Order of the trial Court denying Appellant's 
Motion to dismiss should be reversed and the case re-
manded with instructions to dismiss the Respondent's 
Complaint. 
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